Florida International University

FIU Digital Commons
Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center

College of Arts, Sciences & Education

8-2011

Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New
Trends and Lessons from Colombia
Douglas Farah
International Assessment and Strategy Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/whemsac
Recommended Citation
Farah, Douglas, "Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia" (2011). Western Hemisphere
Security Analysis Center. 29.
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/whemsac/29

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts, Sciences & Education at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact dcc@fiu.edu.

Mapping Transnational
Crime in El Salvador:

New Trends and Lessons from
Colombia

Douglas Farah
International Assessment and
Strategy Center

August 2011
This report is based in significant part on research in El Salvador and
Guatemala carried out in the past year with the support of the
International Assessment and Strategy Center.

Mapping Transnational
Crime in El Salvador:

New Trends and Lessons from
Colombia

Douglas Farah
International Assessment and
Strategy Center

August 2011

The views expressed in this research paper are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or
position of the US Government, Department of Defense, US
Southern Command or Florida International University.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since El Salvador‟s civil war formally ended in 1992 the
small Central American nation has undergone profound
social changes and significant reforms. However, few
changes have been as important or as devastating as the
nation‟s emergence as a central hub in the transnational
criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping
chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to
traffic in drugs, money, weapons, human being, endangered
animals and other products.
The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the
civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in
criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and
dangerous characteristic of El Salvador‟s transnational
criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides,
with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were
marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups
moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing
protection services to transnational criminal organizations to
becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves.
The demand for specialized military and transportation
services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs
consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their
relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in
flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also
because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with
each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the
geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from
Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military
capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities.
The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often
with significant ties to the formal political structure (state)
1

through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative
corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the
1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately
challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy
of embedded corruption within the nation‟s political
structure.
Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in
nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile
global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of
both local crime ―with gangs vying for control of specific
geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe
passage of illicit products― and transnational groups that
need to use that space to successfully move their products.
These symbiotic relationships are both complex and
generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated
and dangerous.

2

INTRODUCTION
Since El Salvador‟s civil war formally ended in 1992 the
small Central American nation has undergone profound
social changes and significant reforms. However, few
changes have been as important or as devastating as the
nation‟s emergence as a central hub in the transnational
criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping
chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to
traffic in drugs, money, weapons, human being, endangered
animals and other products.
The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often
with significant ties to the formal political structure (state)
through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative
corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the
1980s, where a plethora of violent groups ultimately
challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy
of embedded corruption within the nation‟s political
structure. In cases, multiple porous borders and historic
smuggling routes, the accompanying “cultures of
contraband”1 and the historic abandonment of the state of
significant geographic zones ―particularly border regions―
have led to violence and illicit smuggling activities. 2
1

For an examination of the “cultures of contraband” and their
implications in the region see: Rebecca B. Galemba, “Cultures of
Contraband: Contesting the Illegality at the Mexico-Guatemala Border,”
Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University Department of Anthropology, May
2009.
2
The author, a former Washington Post correspondent, lived in El
Salvador from 1985-1990, covering the civil wars, and in Colombia from
1990-1992 covering the drug wars. From 1992-1997 he lived in El
Salvador again but continued to regularly cover the Andean drug wars.
From 1997-2000 he covered drug trafficking on a broader scale as the
Post‟s international investigative correspondent. Since 2008, as a
consultant, Farah has visited both Colombia and Central America
frequently to work on transnational criminal issues. The interviews cited
in this report were with a broad range of law enforcement and

3

Unlike Colombia, El Salvador, aside from the human
trafficking element, has little to contribute in terms of
product, to the lucrative illicit pipelines. What it offers is a
prime geographic location with sophisticated transportation
networks that have extensive reach southward to the
production areas of cocaine and northward to the Mexican
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) that now control the
bulk of the cocaine trade into the world‟s most lucrative
market, the United States. Because of its geographic
location, El Salvador is sometimes referred to in drug
trafficking circles as “El Caminito” or the Little Pathway,
which cuts across the north of El Salvador, from the border
with Honduras to the border with Guatemala, carrying drugs
heading from Colombia to Mexico and the United States. 3
"El Caminito”

Source: http://www.elfaro.net/es/201105/noticias/4079/.
intelligence officials in Central America, as well as sources involved in
transnational criminal activities and gangs. Due to the risk the sources
would run if identified by name, their information is used anonymously.
3
http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/939-texis-cartelcontrols-el-salvador-cocaine-route.
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The transportista networks, protected by corrupt officials in
the police, military, judiciary, customs, immigration and
National Assembly, are the value added that Salvadoran
organized criminal structures bring to the current drug
trafficking structures. As will be examined below, two
particular local networks, the Cartel de Texis and Los
Perrones Orientales, clearly demonstrate this capture of
specific parts of the State while strengthening their ties to
Mexican organizations.
As one observer recently noted:
The role the region plays is simple, but the
consequences are devastating. Smugglers in
Central America serve one vital purpose: to
transport drugs between South America and
Mexico. For that reason, they are known in
the region as 'transportistas.' Increasingly,
however, these organizations have also taken
on the role of local distributors and, in some
cases, the suppliers of marijuana and poppy,
for the production of heroin, as well as
importers and suppliers for the raw
ingredients of synthetic drugs that are
manufactured in Mexico, Nicaragua and
possibly Honduras.4
The growth of these transportista networks and other
developments discussed below are part of what the recent
Obama administration‟s National Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) aptly noted is a trend
where “TOC networks are proliferating, striking new and
4

Steven Dudley, “Central America‟s „Transportistas,‟” InSight:
Organized Crime in the Americas, November 21, 2010, accessed at:
http://insightcrime.org/investigations/insight-exclusives/item/255insight-brief-central-americas-transportistas.
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powerful alliances, and engaging in a range of illicit
activities as never before. The result is a convergence of
threats that have evolved to become more complex, volatile,
and destabilizing.”5
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
These pipelines‟ pathways through El Salvador are not new
and have almost always been linked to illicit networks in
neighboring countries, particularly in Guatemala, Honduras
and Nicaragua. These linkages remain important today.
While not the topic of this paper, these linkages cannot be
ignored in understanding the emerging criminal structures in
El Salvador and the region.
During the nation‟s civil war in the 1980s the Marxist-led
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (Frente
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional-FMLN)
developed extensive smuggling networks through Nicaragua
and Honduras for its weapons supplies and logistical
support.6 The far right maintained significant clandestine
networks through Guatemala, particularly for back channel

5

“FACT SHEET: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,”
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, press release, July 25,
2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/25/fact-sheetstrategy-combat-transnational-organized-crime.
6
The most clearly documented case in recent times of the former FMLN
groups operating is the case of Jose Luis Merino, AKA Ramiro, who was
a Communist Party urban commando during the war and implicated in
kidnappings in the mid-1990s and weapons sales to the FARC rebels in
Colombia as late as 2008. For details of Merino's alleged ties, see: José
de Córdoba, "The Man Behind the Man," Poder 360 Magazine, April
2009; Douglas Farah, "The FARC's International Relations: A Network
of Deception, NEFA Foundation, September 22, 2008; José de Córdoba,
" Chávez Ally May Have Aided Colombian Guerrillas: Emails Seem to
Tie Figure to a Weapons Deal," The Wall Street Journal, August 28,
2008.
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intelligence sharing and the movement of arms and
personnel.7
As far back as early 1990, almost immediately after the war
in El Salvador ended, there were media reports on the
growing role of Central America as a transshipment point for
drugs, primarily cocaine, to the United States.8 There were
even published reports by a former agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) saying Medellin cartel
leader Pablo Escobar had met with then-president Vinicio
Cerezo of Guatemala to arrange for the transshipment of
large amounts of cocaine through Central America. 9
A major investigation of post‐conflict armed groups in 1994
found that the “illegal armed groups” operating after the war
had “morphed” into more sophisticated, complex
organizations than had existed during the war, and that, as
self‐financing entities they had a strong criminal economic
component, as well as political aspect, to their operations.
This was among the first serious efforts to identify the
enduring clandestine structures of the civil war as new

7

For a look at the enduring network in Central America, see: “Células
nunca se desactivaron,” La Prensa Gráfica (El Salvador), August 31,
2010, accessed at:
http://www.laprensagrafica.com/internacionales/latinoamerica/131431celulas-nunca-se-desactivaron.html.
8
See, for example: Shirley Christian, “Central America a New Drug
Focus,” The New York Times, December 16, 1991, p. A10, where she
described the movement of cocaine by “using private planes, small boats,
tractor-trailer rigs and other vehicles.” See also: Lindsey Gruson, “Drug
Trafficking and Poppy Growing Find Lush Home in Guatemala,”
October 17, 1989. In his article, Gruson noted that Guatemala is “almost
exactly halfway between the Colombian cocaine processing laboratories
and the American markets.”
9
“Castillo: Pablo Escobar se reunió con Vinicio Cerezo,” Siglo XXI
(Guatemala), July 31, 1996.
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elements in the country‟s nascent transitional organized
crime structure.10
The early illicit groups that grew out of the war were initially
engaged in kidnappings, both in El Salvador and abroad. The
early abductions were carried out primarily by members of
the Communist Party who never demobilized after the war,
but often acting at the behest of extreme right and financed
by their one-time ideological enemies.
THE NEW AND THE DANGEROUS
This erasing of the once-clear ideological lines and the
ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces is an enduring and
dangerous characteristic of El Salvador‟s transnational
criminal evolution. When the conflict ended, thousands of
combatants on both sides were demobilized into a society
that offered few jobs or prospects for gainful employment.
These trained, elite cadres of urban commandos, intelligence
officers, and clandestine operatives found their skills were
marketable in the growing criminal structures. Soon the
groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing
protection services to transnational DTOs and human
smuggling gangs, car theft rings and other illicit activities.11
10

The investigation was carried out by a special commission formed in
1992, composed of the nation‟s human rights ombudsman, a
representative of the United Nations Secretary General, and two
representatives of the Salvadoran government. The commission was
formed by a political agreement among all the major parties due to
resurgence in political violence after the signing of the historic peace
accords. See: “Informe del Grupo Conjunto Para la Investigación de
Grupos Armados Ilegales con Motivación Política en El Salvador,” El
Salvador, July 28, 1994, accessed January 26 at:
http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/idhuca/grupo.html.
11
For a more complete look at the evolution of these gangs, particularly
the seminal kidnapping of Andrés Shuster, see: Douglas Farah,
“Organized Crime in El Salvador: The Homegrown and Transnational
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While these groups had some relationships with TCOs and
were part of a criminal element, they did not traditionally
pose a significant threat to the state nor were they fully
integrated into the TCO structures that used the Salvador
pipeline.
The consolidation of cocaine market by Mexican DTOs,
however, has spurred the growth and importance of
Salvadoran TCOs, both the transportista networks to move
products and the recruitment of Salvadorans as foot soldiers
in business. The demand for these services has exploded and
the value of their services has risen dramatically because of
the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other
in Mexico, are seeking to physically control the geographic
space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to
Panama. Because of this they are eager to increase their
military capabilities and intelligence gathering capabilities.
This, in turn, requires more political access and state
penetration in order to guarantee the stable movement of
products across the country, access usually gained through
corruption, the threat of violence or violence when
necessary.
As Carlos Dada, a well-known investigative journalist in El
Salvador who has monitored the drug trafficking situation
for years noted, the power of the transportistas has increased
“because they own policemen, judges, congressmen, local
mayors, etc. So they charge drug cartels for crossing that
territory free of threats from security forces ― because they
manage everything. So you pay them ― if you are a drug
cartel, you pay them. And you have a free pass from
Honduras to Guatemala.”12
Dimensions,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
February 2011.
12
Jason Beaubien, “El Salvador Grapples With Upswing in Drug
Traffic,” NPR Morning Edition, May 31, 2011.
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The Salvador recruits for the Mexican DTOs, often identified
by cartel recruiters using lists of potential candidates
purchased from those special forces troops they already
employ, are offered about $4,000 a month as a starting salary
to work either in the military structures of the cartels or as
trainers. The advantage that the Salvadoran Special Forces
recruits offer, according to one source that has been
approached by the cartels, is that they are immediately
deployable. Many have also maintained personal contacts
with networks of intelligence and former comrades across
the region, bringing immediate entrée into new networks and
intelligence capabilities.13
Against this backdrop, the current situation is characterized
by:
 The growing financial and political strength of the
multiple groups vying for control of the transnational
pipelines, and the growing recruitment of retired
special forces members on behalf of Mexican DTOs,
particularly the Zetas;
 The physical presence of Mexican DTOs in El
Salvador and their direct contact with the street
gangs, particularly the MS-13;
 The dramatically increased access to intelligence the
Mexican DTOs and their local allies have achieved;
 The expanding use of El Salvador, with a dollarized
economy, as a hub for money laundering, particularly
since Mexico enacted significant new restrictions on
dollar transactions;
 Increased evidence of the sale of sophisticated
weaponry from the Salvadoran military (and other
militaries in the region) to Mexican DTOs;

13

Author interviews with an officer targeted for recruitment and army
intelligence sources in El Salvador, May and July 2011.
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The growth of small, armed quasi-ideological groups
of students being recruited by the Venezuelanfinanced Bolivarian axis for training, including
training of elite cadres in Iran;
The growing sophistication and reorganization of
parts of one of the main gangs (Mara Salvatrucha or
MS-13) into a more structured transnational criminal
enterprise that can cooperate and compete with
Mexican DTOs in-country, and is providing
increasingly levels of gunmen to the Zetas operating
in Guatemala and Mexico.

These developments pose a significant new security
challenge, unprecedented in scale and threat potential, to El
Salvador, the Central American region, Mexico and
ultimately the United States. As the political and economic
power of these local groups providing services to
transnational criminal organizations grows, new group are
forming and more sectors of the Salvadoran state are being
captured by the illicit network structure.
THE MAIN TRANSPORTIST AS NETWORKS IN EL
SALVADOR
Among the transportista groups that exemplify the new
generation of transnational criminal activity in El Salvador is
the Cartel de Texis, named for the town of Texistepeque,
where some of its leaders come from. Like most of the
known transportista networks, the Cartel de Texis is not
new, and has been in operation since at least 2000. Its
operational territory along the Honduran border includes the
once famous “ruta del queso” or “cheese route” used to
smuggle Honduran cheese into El Salvador at the turn of the
20th century.

11

Drug Route from Colombia to El Salvador

Source: http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20110703/domingo/197615/.

In an extensive series of reports, El Salvador‟s online
investigative newspaper, El Faro, detailed the growing
importance of the organization and some of its links to
Mexican DTOs.14 A main hub of the group‟s operations is
the town of San Fernando, Chalatenango, on the border with
Honduras and close to the Guatemalan border.
The organization is allegedly run by José Adán Salazar
Umaña, AKA “Chepe Diablo,” a well-known leader of a
Division 1 soccer team and rancher based in the western city
of Metapán. The cocaine is reportedly delivered by sea or air
in Honduras, and then transported overland to the care of
Cartel de Texis. As described by El Faro, the system works
seamlessly.

14

Sergio Arauz, Óscar Martínez, and Efrén Lemus, “El Cartel de Texis,”
El Faro, May 16, 2011, accessed at:
http://www.elfaro.net/es/201105/noticias/4079/.
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San Fernando is the hand-off point where the
Hondurans hand the drugs off to the
Salvadorans, on a route directed by Mexicans
and Colombians. A highway worth millions of
dollars to those who control it, composed of
businessmen, ranchers, mayors, police, gang
members, coyotes [those who handle human
trafficking], and congressmen. Everyone
plays a role. The policemen bought by narcos
guard and move the drugs, remove
roadblocks and warn of impending
operations. The mayors give construction
permits, formalize businesses and act as
privileged informants―in one case acting as
a group leader; congressmen give access to
high levels of power. Gang members kill and
traffic in local markets; and some judges and
prosecutors make sure no legal case can
advance.”15
The trafficking of drugs represented in many ways an easy
expansion of these long-time illicit transportation pipelines,
where the protection of customs officials and local law
enforcement was already established. The addition of
cocaine to the pipeline added orders of magnitude to the
profits for all involved but represented relatively little risk to
the transporters.
What is different is the size of the operations, the amount of
money made, the level of political influence, and the
violence that accompanies the group‟s criminal activities and
the range of Mexican DTOs involved. Salvadoran and

15

Araúz, Martínez and Lemus, op cit.

13

regional law enforcement officials said the group was among
the most important in the region.16
The Cartel de Texis is similar in many regards to another
transportista network, Los Perrones Orientales, operating on
the Pacific coast, headquartered in the city of San Miguel
and using the coastal highway network as the primary
transportation route to Guatemala. The group modeled itself
on the Mexican cartels and, imitating the preferences of
many of the Mexican DTO leaders, imported large numbers
of thoroughbred horses to race, built expensive car racing
tracks and commissioned “narco corridos” or songs about
their exploits, often played on local radio stations.
Most of the cocaine moved by this network arrives on gofast boats that drop their cargo in the high seas near the
coastline with GPS guidance systems attached so they can be
found. An increasing amount of the deliveries are coming
through submersible and semi-submersible crafts being built
in Ecuador and Colombia. In addition to being virtually
impossible to detect, the newer crafts have the capacity to
carry up to 10 tons of product, far more than the few hundred
kilograms the go-fast boats can carry. 17
Like the operation of the Cartel de Texis, the Perrones
integrated their corruption in a structured system of
16

Author interviews with Salvadoran, Guatemalan and international
regional law enforcement officials, May and June 2011.
17
Author interviews with Colombian, U.S. and Mexican intelligence
officials. Interestingly, the first attempts by the Colombian drug
traffickers to move to this type of shipment came in 2000, when the
cartels were found to have plans to construct a Russian submarine, and
had acquired most of the necessary parts. The groups then moved to
homemade semi-submersibles, a technology pioneered and likely copied
from, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka. While few of the crafts are built in
Ecuador, many are built near the border region in Esmeraldas and
launched almost immediately into Ecuadoran waters.

14

protection for their illicit activities, including police officials,
local and national politicians, gang members as hired muscle
and local judges and prosecutors. And like the Texis
operation, they were able to work with numerous Mexican
DTOs, from the Zetas to the Sinaloa cartel and even the
Tijuana organization. They also laundered considerable
amounts of money through seemingly legitimate business.
For example, El Salvador‟s Attorney General Office charged
that the owner of a large car sale business in San Miguel
gave cars to a National Assembly member belonging to a
Partido de Conciliación Nacional (National Conciliation
Party—PCN), and these cars were used to bribe at least 10
local mayors and other officials. Curiously, the car sales
business claimed to have done $13.2 million worth in sales
but could only account for about $30,000 of that amount.18
When the first arrests of the Perrones began in 2008, several
senior police officials and several locally powerful
politicians in the San Miguel area were arrested. According
to public reports as the investigations unfolded, at least 43
police officers are under investigation in the case, many of
them members of the U.S.-funded elite Anti-Narcotics
Division (División Anti-Narcótico-DAN). Among those
suspended from his job and still under investigation in the
case is Godofredo Miranda, who was the DAN
commander.19
18

Equipo de Nación, "FGR: Los Perrones Dieron Autos a Silva Para
Pagar Sobornos," La Prensa Gráfica, May 28, 2010.
19
Godofredo Miranda was also named by Rep. James McGovern (DMass), as a possible accomplice in the April 1999 murder and rape of a
9-year-old girl, Katya Miranda, who also requested that President Funes
investigate the Perrones for possible involvement in the November 2004
murder of U.S. Teamster labor organizer Gilberto Soto. McGovern's June
8, 2009 private letter to Funes requesting further investigations into these
cases was leaked to the Salvadoran press and reported widely but not
released by McGovern. According to Salvadoran investigators, Soto,
who was organizing truck drivers in around the port of Usulután, was

15

According to an internal police report obtained by the author,
the Perrones organization maintained ties to prominent
politicians in the eastern region, where the right-wing
ARENA party has dominated and the National Conciliation
Party, traditionally linked to the military, remains a force.
The document outlines the Perrones ties to businesses for
laundering money, bribes for protection, and ties to extensive
influence within municipalities in the region. 20
MONEY MOVEMENTS THROUGH EL SALVADOR
There is broad agreement that the decision to convert El
Salvador‟s official currency from the Colón to the U.S.
dollar in 2001 marked a significant change in El Salvador‟s
national life. While there were numerous reasons for taking
such a dramatic step, one of the most important collateral
consequences over time has been to make the tiny nation a
center of money laundering activities.21
As the U.S. State Department noted in its most recent report
on money laundering :
“El Salvador has an unusually rapidly growing
banking system with little, other than its
dollarized economy and remittance flow, to
support such growth … The country’s dollarized
economy and geographic location make it an
killed because he stumbled on the Perrones drug operations in the port
warehouses and their use of tractor-trailer trucks to move cocaine. For
more on the ongoing investigation into Miranda, see: Equipo de Nación,
"Inspectoría Continúa Indagando a Ex-Jefe DAN," La Prensa Gráfica,
August 31, 2010.
20
Confidential internal police report in possession of the author.
21
For a comprehensive look at the pros and cons of the dollarization, see:
David S. Block and William Robert Nelson, Jr., “Dollarization in El
Salvador: The Costs of Economic Stability,” Latin American Law and
Business Report, April 30, 2003.
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ideal haven for transnational organized crime
groups, including human and drug trafficking
organizations. The Central America Four
Agreement between El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua allows for the free
movement of citizens of these countries across
their respective borders without passing through
immigration or customs inspection. As such, the
agreement represents a vulnerability to each
country for the cross-border movement of
contraband and illicit proceeds of crime.”22
With a poorly regulated banking structure and no need to
convert from another currency to cash, El Salvador‟s
booming banking systems is indicative of a significantly
enhanced role in laundering drug money, particularly since
the Mexican government has made it more difficult to move
money directly into Mexico. Sources with direct knowledge
of illicit money movements in the region said that much of
the bulk cash that traditionally flowed into Mexico is now
being moved from the United States to El Salvador and other
“dollarized” economies (Ecuador and Panama both use the
U.S. dollar as their official currency), then trucked north
through Guatemala or placed in the formal banking structure
through complicit banks.23
“There is really nothing easier,” said one source familiar
with cartel money operations. “If you get the cash to El
Salvador then there is no problem getting it into the banks,
because no one asks any questions, and the cartels have
22

United States Department of State, 2011 International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II: Money Laundering and
Financial Crimes Country Database, May 20, 2011, accessed at:
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/database/164076.htm#El_Salv
ador.
23
Author interview with two sources that move drug money in Central
America, May and July 2011.

17

prearranged everything. The money goes in as dollars and
comes out as dollars in „clean‟ account. The cartels can get
access to it from anywhere in the world and it is washed,
laundered and dried.”24
In one recent incident that demonstrates the amount of
money moving through the country, in September 2010
police investigators found two plastic barrels full of $100
bills and Euro notes buried on a small farm outside the town
of Zacatecoluca, in central El Salvador. The first barrel was
reported to contain $7,196,850 in U.S. dollars and 1,684,500
Euros, and the second barrel had a similar amount.25
A source who has dealt with illicit money flows, suggests
that:
The real problem the Mexican cartels are
having now is how to convert $10 and $20
bills into larger bills, to reduce the bulk….The
second is how to move all the money that is
accumulating in Central America back to
Mexico or on to Colombia. They have more
money than they can move comfortably now,
but no one wants to leave millions of dollars
in a warehouse. The risk is too high. So there
is a large bottleneck.26
SHIFTING ALLIANCES AND SHIFTING TARGETS
The relationships of Salvadoran transportista organizations
with Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs),
24

Author interview in Guatemala, June 2011.
Marcela Solís and Mauricio Bolaños, "Encuentran Segundo Barril con
Dinero en Zacatecoluca," La Prensa Gráfica (El Salvador), September 4,
2010.
26
Author interview with source that moves drug money in Central
America, July 2011.
25
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particularly the Sinaloa cartel and Los Zetas are still in flux
and shift rapidly. However, what is clear is that the
emergence of the Mexican DTO structures in El Salvador is
giving both the Mexican organizations and their local
partners increased resources to hollow out the nation state
structure by crippling the judicial, law enforcement,
legislative and regulatory structures.
As the state capture advances, the Mexican DTOs and armed
groups are more easily able to open the country and the
region to a growing array of other criminal groups, including
some such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC)
from Colombia and Hezbollah from Lebanon, that are
designated terrorist entities by the United States.
At the same time, as noted above, remnants of the old
ideological armed structures on both the right and the left
continue to operate. Of particular concern are groups of
university students being recruited in small groups and sent
for ideological training in Venezuela, and then, for the best
cadres, training in Iran. The training, according to three
people who have been through the training, is both
ideological and embracing of armed struggle.
Those trained cadres, in turn, have formed small groups that
have trained militarily on the outskirts of San Salvador, in
areas where the FMLN was traditionally active. According to
two sources with direct knowledge of events, the Bloque
Popular
Juvenil,
a
self-defined
Marxist-Leninist
organization of the Communist Party, is the primary link
among these armed groups.27

27

Author interviews with former BPJ members and members of the
Communist Party, May 2010 and June 2011.
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The Mexican DTOs are also actively recruiting in El
Salvador. The Zetas, in particular, are targeting the
Salvadoran military, and other military and police forces in
the region, for the purchase of sophisticated weapons.
Numerous cases made public in the past year indicate that
the militaries of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala all
have had seen military officials sell or attempt to sell
significant amounts of sophisticated weaponry to Mexican
DTOs. 28
In June 2011, Gen. David Munguía, the
Salvadoran defense minister, called for a regional effort to
halt the flow of weapons from the south toward Mexico.
All the militaries of Central America, the
police, the municipal police, all those with
weapons, should take measures to insure they
are not stolen,” Munguía said. “The Mexican
cartels have established a rearguard area for
themselves in Central America, a logistics
base. The cartels that operate in southern
Mexico and those that operate in Guatemala
are trying to supply themselves with weapons
from Central America.29
Two cases stand out in El Salvador for their audacity. The
first was an attempt by six army officials to steal 1,812
fragmentation grenades that were supposed to be destroyed.
Rather than blow up the munitions as required, the group
buried them, staged a fake explosion to demonstrate the
weapons had been destroyed, and planned to dig them up and
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sell them to the Zetas. While the group was eventually
busted, Munguía and other military officials said it had been
operational for a significant period of time before being
dismantled.30
The second case is more complex with broader international
implications. Hector Antonio Martinez Guillén, a recently
retired army officer known as “el Capitán,” was arrested in
May 2011 following a sting operation in which he sought to
provide the FARC in Colombia with plastic explosives,
automatic rifles and ammunition in exchange for $1 million
in cocaine. At one point he provided 20 pounds of C-4
explosives to undercover DEA officials posing as FARC
representatives.31 Given the FARC‟s support by members of
El Salvador‟s Communist Party and the former officer‟s
enlistment in a pro-U.S. military, the case shows just how
irrelevant for ideologies have become.
In addition to the new types of recruitment being carried out
among former combatants, the traditional gang structure,
particularly the MS-13, is restructuring many of its “cliques”
or sub-units, into more disciplined operators who are
acquiring significantly enhanced military training and
forging new relationships with the Mexican DTOs,
particularly the Zetas. As part of this restructuring,
consumption of drugs is prohibited among gang members,
the traditional gang tattoos are removed or covered up and
there is more formal coordination among the leaders on the
ground in El Salvador and their U.S.-based leaders or leaders
who are imprisoned in El Salvador.
30
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According to two sources who work extensively with the
gangs, the senior leadership, directed by U.S.-based leaders,
has developed a working relationship with the Zetas to
provide militarily trained cadres to work for the organization
in Guatemala, primarily as security. They are valued, the
sources said, because they do not have family in the areas
and have no loyalties or attachments, allowing them to act in
a more cold-blooded way than local recruits would be
willing to.
In addition, the sources said, those working with the Zetas
view themselves as partners in the operation, not as
subservient to the Mexicans, and some of the money paid the
gang members by the DTOs goes to support the MS-13,
rather than to the individual. This is due in part to the fact
that the Zetas, while maintaining a presence on the ground in
El Salvador, do not have a way to project significant military
force there yet, and therefore do not want to take on the
gangs and try to force them into submission.
Partly as a result of this and the gang‟s own growing strength
in terms of firepower and control of territory, the MS-13 also
provides its services to other DTOs that are often in conflict
with the Zetas. This ability of Salvadoran groups to work
across the warring factions of Mexican DTOs, at least at this
time, is an interesting characteristic of the drug trade. 32
PARALLELS TO THE COLOMBIA CASE
In many ways the current case of TCOs in El Salvador is
similar to the developments in Colombia in the 1980s and
early 1990s, when the Medellín and Cali cartels
predominated and narco violence was at its peak. There are
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also some significant differences in the situations that make
direct comparisons more difficult.
Among the similarities are:
State Penetration and Capture in Specific Points: As the
cases of the Perrones and the Cartel de Texis show, the
Salvadoran transportistas have proven themselves adept at
coopting specific, local political and police structures as well
as making inroads into the national political and law
enforcement structures. This closely parallels the strategy of
the Colombian organizations that generally (with the
exception of Pablo Escobar at the height of the extradition
wars in 1989-1991) did not seek direct political power, but
rather focused on buying protection within the system. Even
the significant corruption of the constitutional convention of
1991 in Colombia by the Medellín cartel was aimed
primarily at banning extradition rather than advancing a
coherent overall political agenda.33 In El Salvador, there are
significant allegations of senior police corruption,
particularly in the corridors where cocaine shipments move,
as well as high-level protection of TOCs within the judicial
branch and protection by local mayors.
The Culture of Violence: In both cases the illicit activities
have bred pockets of violence with homicide rates many
times higher than regional average or historic norm. While
El Salvador‟s armed conflict formally ended in 1992 and
Colombia has not reached a negotiated end of the conflict
with its two largest insurgent groups, in both cases many of
the smuggling routes and ensuing alliances among regional
actors have been forged in those conflicts.34
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Among the most intriguing elements shared by El Salvador
now and the former situation in Colombia is the emergence
of young gangs as important foot soldiers in the drug trade,
similar in many ways to the sicarios or young hit men who
killed for the cartels, particularly in the comunas or hillside
slums of Medellín.
In both cases disaffected young men found a type of home or
social family outside the mainstream society, in groups that
relied heavily on a culture of violence to engender that
feeling of community. Both adopted a quasi-religious
mystique and justification for their actions, praying to
specific saints or virgins that their aim would be true, while
idealizing their own mothers, almost to the point of
veneration. In both cases, father figures are largely absent in
the family life.
The sicarios, recruited in the comunas, were the cannon
fodder of the war that raged between the Colombian State
and the cartels and were driven by a similar sense of life
being short and the inevitability of violent death that
pervades the Mara Salvatrucha and Calle 18 gangs in El
Salvador. In El Salvador, the gangs are undergoing a
profound transformation but have traditionally been made up
of alienated young men who expect to die young or spend
most of their lives in prison.35
The End of Ideology: Another disturbing parallel between
Colombia in more recent years and the situation of violence
in El Salvador is the demonstrated ability of different groups,
once separated by ideology, to work together. While already
35
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described above in the Salvadoran context, the presence of
“bandas criminales (BACRIM) in Colombia, a catch-all
description for emerging criminal gangs, is a similar
phenomenon. Where once paramilitary groups allied with the
military fought the Marxist-led FARC, in recent years these
battle lines have become blurred and merged with drug
trafficking organizations.
Gen. Oscar Naranjo, Director of the Colombian National
Police, now considers the BACRIM to be a greater national
security threat than the FARC, and responsible for more
violence.36 What is most alarming about the BACRIM is that
they are often made up of former paramilitary members who
did not demobilize under the controversial amnesty program
for their groups, as well as deserters from the FARC who
have lost any semblance of ideological justification for their
activities. These mixed groups are particularly active on the
northwestern border with Ecuador, where they are
sometimes at war and sometimes work together with the
FARC‟s 48th Front.37 The loss of ideological cohesion and
the ability of trained units, at one time on different sides of a
major conflict, to work together usually mark a significant
advance in creation of sophisticated transnational criminal
organizations in a region.
Havoc in the Financial System: The barrels of cash found
in El Salvador are similar to those encountered by
Colombian cartels during the heyday of the Medellín and
Cali cartels, when Gonzalo Rodrigo Gacha, Pablo Escobar
and others, were known to bury millions of dollars on their
36
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extensive rural properties. And like El Salvador, Colombia
saw an explosion of banking activity that would be hard to
justify in normal economic terms. The circulation of such
large amounts of illicit money has numerous consequences
on the legal economic structure. The primary one is to drive
legitimate businesses out of the market and a secondary is to
provide enormous amounts of money that amplify the ability
of drug traffickers or their allies to buy their way into the
system for protection.38 Years after reducing the existential
threat of the drug cartels to the state and the passage of
numerous laws to combat the flow of illicit funds, Colombia
is still struggling to make headway against this phenomenon.
Among the differences between El Salvador and Colombia
are:
Insurgency against the government: There are significant
differences between the situations of violence and illicit
activities between El Salvador now Colombia in the
late1980s and early 1990s. El Salvador now does not have an
organized, armed insurgency fighting to overthrow the
government, in contrast to the FARC and ELN insurgencies
in Colombia. No centralized group with an identifiable
leader has emerged such as Pablo Escobar and the Medellín
cartel in the Colombian context, followed by the Cali cartel,
the Northern Valley organizations and others. While El
Salvador has identifiable transportista structures such as Los
Perrones and the Cartel de Texis, these groups tend to work
for a variety of DTOs, and are themselves without a
coherent, integrated, overarching structure.
Historically, while Colombian organizations focused on
cocaine smuggling, Salvadoran organizations focused on the
38
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movement of migrants seeking to illegally enter the United
States. These illicit pipelines are increasingly becoming
merged and indistinguishable, but each set of pipelines
serves a different purpose.
Transnational Structures: Perhaps one of the most notable
differences between the situation in Colombia and the
current situation in El Salvador has to do with the
transnational structures of DTOs. Sicarios in Escobar‟s
empire but did not have a transnational structure that reached
into major cities in the United States and neighboring
countries, and the Salvadoran gang structures do. The
sicarios were more directly employed in the cartel structure
than most of the gang operations in El Salvador, and the
Colombian DTOs at the time generally did not work with
non-Colombians in any significant way. There were a few
exceptions but the transportation structures relied largely on
air transport to U.S. territory and Colombian control of major
retail operations to wholesalers. Thus, there was seldom a
need to negotiate with the transportista networks to move
products. In contrast, the Mexican organizations use more
land and sea routes and actively seek to control the territory
through which their products pass. This gives the Mexican
DTOs the impetus to develop a wide range of relationships
with groups that are not directly integrated into the
trafficking structure but who are vital to the success of the
enterprise.
THE ROAD AHEAD
El Salvador, like the rest of Central America, is rapidly
reaching a tipping point in its ability to successfully tackle,
even in a limited sense, the multiple issues in combating
transnational organized crime and the money that flows from
those organizations. This constitutes a direct threat to the
nation‟s fragile democratic process and post-war recovery by
27

hollowing out the state and draining enormous amounts of
resources from the legitimate economy.
As it has in recent years, El Salvador, with its extensive and
lightly guarded land and sea borders and ideally situated
geographically as a transshipment point, will likely continue
to grow in importance. What sets El Salvador apart from
other nations in the region at this point is that it remains
meeting and recruitment ground for multiple Mexican DTOs,
rather than territory largely controlled by a single
organization. In contrast, Guatemala is a significant area of
influence of the Zetas while Honduras remains a stronghold
for the Sinaloa cartel.
Given the demonstrated adaptive capacity of the gangs in El
Salvador and their growing sophistication and ties to the
Mexican DTOs, it is likely these groups will continue to
expand their territorial control and become more integrated
into the armed structure of larger organizations.
As the cases of the Cartel de Texis and Los Perrones show,
El Salvador‟s primary value added to the cocaine pipeline is
to successfully move illicit products across the territory they
control before handing the goods off to Mexican
organizations. This multi-national transportista network, tied
together both through the gangs and through long-standing
smuggling networks, has an extensive reach into the
political, law enforcement and judicial structures of El
Salvador and most of the rest of the Central American
region. Given the time it has taken to begin to unravel known
groups and the political cost of doing so, these groups will
likely continue to grow in power and influence.
Organized crime in El Salvador has now reached the point
where it is transnational in nature and more integrated into
stronger, more versatile global networks such, as the
28

Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime ―with
gangs vying for control of specific geographic space so they
can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products―
and transnational groups that need to use that space to
successfully move their products. These symbiotic
relationships are both complex and generally transient in
nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.
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INTERVIEWS
During May and July 2011, the author conducted numerous
interviews with law enforcement and intelligence officials in
Central America, as well as with individuals involved in
transnational criminal and gang activities. Due to the
sensibility and risks for the sources if identified by name, the
author has used the information anonymously. The author
also interviewed law enforcement officials in Ecuador and
Colombia in November 2010.
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